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Introduction 
 
Like previous studies that have analysed the relationship between economic integration, 
interdependence and political cooperation/peace (see: Polachek, 1980; Barbieri, 1996; Copeland, 
1996; Reuveny, 2001: Gartzke et al., 2001; Kanafani, 2001: Bearce, 2003; Oneal et al., 2003; 
McDonald, 2004: Bearce and Omori, 2005; Benson and Niou, 2007; Kilchevsky, et al., 2007; Saez, 
2008; Aydin, 2010; Goldsmith, 2013) this study has clear policy implications for current political 
leaders in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and elsewhere. Since the late 1980s many 
governments in the MENA have adopted (to some extent, often wholeheartedly) policies aimed at 
integrating their national economies with the broader global economy and with each other in order 
to promote welfare gains (economic development) in their own markets. A second, albeit seemingly 
less emphasised goal, has been to promote regional stability/peace (through political cooperation).  
The impact of these policies on promoting trade within the region, and subsequently their impact on 
regional peace, is not understood. Commercial institutional peace analysis tends to consider all 
states in the global system and applies generalizable conclusions to all regions and states equally. 
Yet, a deeper analysis of the impacts of commercial institutions and trade in the MENA region (and 
other regions) may reveal a different story of the ways in which trade influences state behaviour. 
This study tests the validity of the commercial institutional peace theory in the context of the MENA 
region, and investigates how trade influences inter-state relations in the region.   
Within the liberal peace research agenda we find the commercial institutional peace 
literature that investigates the impact of trade promotion policies on peace. As part of this research 
agenda, scholars in IR and IPE have argued that any two states with high levels of largely 
symmetrical bilateral trade and deep economic integration (through intra- and inter-industry trade 
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and investment) will result in high levels of embedded interdependence and this will promote peace 
between them through reducing the chances of war.  
 
Hypotheses 
This study considers the prospects for a liberal peace in the MENA by analysing two separate but 
inter-connected stages of the commercial institutional peace. Firstly, we need to consider whether 
commercial institutions in the region have promoted intra-regional trade. Secondly, we can then 
analyse if trade has had an impact on promoting peace within the region. One hypothesis is tested at 
each stage of this study. These are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: commercial institutions in the MENA region promote trade within the region; 
 
Hypothesis 2: higher levels of largely symmetrical bilateral trade promotes peace by deterring 
aggression (deterrence arises because trade raises the opportunity costs of conflict, while at the 
same time increasing the rewards of cooperation). Therefore, increased trade and economic 
integration between MENA states will lead to increased political cooperation and greater potential 
for peace and stability at the regional level. 
 
Commercial Institutions, Trade and Peace: understanding the debate 
 
Kilchevsky et al. (2007: 647) have highlighted the need to ‘move from the general insight offered by 
past studies to more region-specific models and analyses at lower levels of aggregation.’ 
Furthermore, they observed that the theoretical argument that peace can be achieved through 
trade may ‘not be as general as their authors intended or believed them to be’ (ibid) and therefore 
more research is needed to develop our understanding of the extent to which this liberal notion is 
applicable to specific regions/groups of states and why. In their study, Kilchevsky et al. analysed the 
relationship between economic interdependence and peace between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and 
Turkey. By focusing on the nature of trade and changes in political cooperation/peaceful relations 
between a small group of states certain conclusions about the validity of the notion of trade 
promoting peace and what factors limit this outcome in the Middle East. Ultimately, Kilchevsky et al. 
demonstrate that while trade between the four states considered in their study remains low (and 
thus the impact on promoting peaceful relations between them in other areas also remains low), 
‘increasing economic linkages in the region can help stabilise the political situation’ (ibid: 661). Given 
the limited levels of intra-regional trade in the MENA and the fact that ‘the region has ‘for the most 
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part, avoided the global trend of regionalism’ (ibid: 648) it is perhaps more useful to analyse trade 
patterns and policies across the region. This study thus analyses a large scale set of relations, that 
demonstrate a greater level of embedded economic, political and institutional engagement in the 
MENA as this can provide further insights into the relationship between economic interactions, 
political cooperation, and stability at the regional level.  
Kilchevsky et al. (2007) offer one of the most coherent of a still limited number of studies 
that seek to investigate how ‘economic interdependence can be converted from a theoretical 
construct to a concrete reality’ (ibid: 648) in the MENA. By using three least square regression 
analysis with conflict as the dependent variable and trade patterns as the independent variable they 
find that the four countries tested are more peaceful when they are more economically integrated 
(ibid). However, limiting their study to Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Turkey may distort the conclusions 
as the dyadic relationships tested are Egypt-Israel, Jordan-Israel, and Turkey-Israel, each of which is a 
relationship influenced by other independent variables such as treaties of peace which also for 
provide for joint economic ventures (in the cases of Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel) or close defence 
ties (Turkey-Israel). Egypt-Jordan, Egypt-Turkey and Jordan-Turkey are not tested as dyads and little 
can be learned about whether or not they are more or less peaceful towards each other given 
greater or lesser levels of economic integration by an analysis that ultimately puts Israel as the 
central dyadic partner. Relationships between Egypt and Jordan, for example, are influenced by 
rather different interests, identities, histories, and processes to Egyptian-Israeli relations, some but 
not all of which are used as control variables by Kilchevsky et al. (who use: conflict, salience, 
symmetry, interdependence, relative power, difference in democratisation, contiguity and IGO 
membership as control variables). While Kilchevsky et al. offer a useful methodological starting point, 
understanding the nature of economic integration and its impacts on political interactions in the 
MENA requires a more comprehensive analysis that takes into account a larger range of dyadic 
relationships, and that considers a greater number of variables that inform trade policies and 
patterns.  
Kilchevsky et al. (2007: 651-652) highlight two sources for ‘events data’ of dyadic 
interactions: Edward Azar’s Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) which uses newspaper sources 
to report on daily events; and Kansas Events Data Study (KEDS) which also relies on news reporting 
for political event data. The limitations of COPDAB are that it covers data from 1948 only until 1978 
meaning it cannot be used to analyse more contemporary data that covers the period of time 
considered in this study. COPDAB does, however, quantify events by degree of conflict and 
cooperation (using a 15-point scale with 1 being the most cooperative and 15 the most conflictive). 
Kilchevsky et al. use the KEDS data source as this uses automated coding of English-language news 
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reports from 1979 until the present, thus generating a larger sample of events. KEDS also classifies 
events as cooperative or conflictive and offers a useful methodological approach for this study.   
 Kilchevsky et al. (ibid: 652-653) measure five trade variables: total dyadic trade, trade share 
by partner, salience (dependence on the bilateral trade relationship), symmetry (equality of trade 
share and dependence), and interdependence. This study will use these same variables plus 
membership of commercial institutions and will also consider a number of control variables (see 
below). Kilchevsky et al. (ibid: 654) measure four control variables: ‘relative levels of power, 
differences in degrees of democratisation, contiguity and mutual [IGO] membership.’  
IR scholarship has traditionally focused on whether or not trade promotes peace through 
reducing the prevalence of armed conflict. The incidence of armed interstate conflict has been the 
measure of the success or failure of economic integration as a means to prevent conflict and 
promote peaceful cooperation. For example, Oneal et al. (2003) have examined the causes of peace 
by analysing the relationship between trade and conflict by asking ‘whether the Kantian influences – 
trade, institutionalized democracy, and joint memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) 
– affect the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes’ (ibid: 372). Bearce (2003) has attempted to 
‘grasp’ the commercial institutional peace by analysing how commercial institutions such as 
‘preferential trade arrangements help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict’ (ibid: 
347). Similarly, McDonald (2004: 547) explores how ‘higher levels of free trade […] reduce military 
conflict between states’, while Bearce and Omori (2005), Saez (2008), Aydin (2010) and Goldsmith 
(2013) have all studied different aspects of the trade and interstate-conflict relationship. Yet, the 
focus on ways in which increased economic integration through trade (or specifically free trade in 
the case of McDonald (2004)) reduces the potential for interstate war does little to further our 
understanding of trade’s effect on increasing cooperation in terms of raising the rewards and 
lowering the opportunity costs of cooperation, as opposed to raising the opportunity costs of war. 
Although Kilchevsky et al. do consider conflict to ‘refer to actions involving the military [as well as] 
actions such as diplomatic protests and the breaking of bilateral agreements’ (Kilchevsky et al., 2007: 
649), they still focus on conflict in international relations as opposed to cooperation.  
Aboud and Minow (2002: 14) put forward the case for an economics first approach arguing 
that ‘economic interaction often leads to political adhesion’ and noting that ‘examples can be found 
in western Europe and |eastern Europe and increasingly in Asia. Politics follows commerce because 
commerce provides mutual benefits across the broad expanse of the population, regardless of race, 
color, religion, or ideology’ (ibid).The experiences of the world of business (where risks are taken far 
more readily than in the world of politics) certainly lend support to this notion. However, as Abboud 
and Minow themselves admit, ‘[g]etting agreement on the stabilizing potential of economic 
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development is easy. Translating that agreement into actual progress on the ground is tough’ (ibid). 
Investigating the ways in which state policies in the MENA exhibit agreement that ‘trade is good’ is 
an important step (this study offers a discussion on trade policy formation below), but analysing how 
commercial institutions are established only takes us so far in our understanding of the political 
economy of trade and political cooperation in the region. Exploring how agreements translate ‘into 
actual progress on the ground’ in terms of political cooperation is an interesting avenue for research 
and one which this study pursues.  
Lawrence Saez (2008) contributes to our understanding of the relationship between trade 
interdependence and conflict reduction by arguing ‘that under certain specific conditions, trade 
interdependence is unlikely to occur and therefore the expected palliative effect of trade on 
militarised inter-state conflict cannot take place’ (ibid: 698). While his study still focuses on the 
relationship between trade and inter-state war, which as discussed in this study limits our 
understanding of how trade can promote political cooperation in other areas of international 
relations, his assessment of the limits of trade occurrence is highly valuable. Saez’s conclusions have 
direct implications for the effect of trade on various aspects of political cooperation (not just conflict 
reduction) and can be used to demonstrate when commercial institutions do not lead to greater 
trade and economic integration. The central thesis of Saez draws on neo-realist literature and states 
that ‘trade is inherently conflictual’ (ibid) and especially where the following conditions apply: 
‘where there is intermittent military friction [and] asymmetry among players’ and where there this a 
regional hegemon, which ‘is likely to be hostile to the interests of its neighbours’ (ibid). A second 
argument posited by Saez is that states that have a history of military conflict with each other will 
not increase bilateral trade with each other, instead finding alternative partners to economically 
integrate with (ibid: 699). Yet as Page (2000: 62) highlights, ‘it is precisely former enemies which may 
want to institutionalize the end of  conflict’. Understanding when enemies become former enemies 
is, therefore, important. To test this position further it is necessary to examine the impact of 
commercial institutions on creating or diverting trade between member states.  
Saez’s main findings are that ‘some regional economies are not structurally disposed to 
undertake trade’ (ibid: 713); and that trade does not lead to peace when ‘the conflict-reducing 
options that are contingent upon the nature of economic interdependence are not present’ (ibid). 
One limitation with these conclusions, however, is that they are used interchangeably to support the 
central thesis that trade does not promote peace, when perhaps there are two separate questions 
being addressed that relate to whether trade takes place, and if it does what is the impact on 
conflict reduction. The relevance of Saez’s work for the present study is how the first question is 
addressed and not the broader question of whether or not trade (when it does occur and when 
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economic integration leads to interdependence) leads to peace. This study reflects on Saez’s 
conclusions about the former question.  
Bearce and Omori (2005) have built on earlier commercial institutional peace research by 
investigating how ‘regional commercial institutions produce their observed pacific effect’ (ibid: 659). 
They tested three causal arguments: firstly, that commercial institutions increase opportunity costs 
for war; second, that commercial institutions provide information on trading partners’ military 
capabilities, thus increasing their ability to bargain for peace; and third, that commercial institutions 
regularly bring high-level state leaders and decision-makers together which can help build trust (ibid). 
By using a statistical model that includes ten variables: trade interdependence, democracy, joint 
alliance, capabilities ratio, hegemony (measured by total GDP), contiguity, joint preferential Trade 
Agreement (PTA), economic integration (including FTA, customs union, common market, monetary 
union), nested military (structures within the commercial institution), and high organs (the number 
of formal forums for state leaders) (ibid: 668-669), and applying it to all region-specific politically 
relevant  dyad-years  from 1951-1985, Bearce and Omori conclude that only the third thesis tested is 
accurate.  
Of particular importance here is the way in which they deal with the problem of which 
actors experience opportunity costs of war. If we consider states as unitary actors then we can 
rather superficially argue that increased trade raises the opportunity cost of war through loss of 
trade. However, as Bearce and Omori (ibid: 662) highlight: ‘it is societal actors who conduct the bulk 
of international commerce, and thus, directly earn the profits of this exchange.’ As commercial 
institutions are created and maintained by state actors, we need to question how they benefit from 
economic interdependence, or how higher opportunity costs of war affect their decision making. 
Bearce (2003) offers one solution here by considering states as autonomous actors that are not 
impacted on by societal (or ‘market’) actors. In this way it is possible to explore whether state actors 
directly suffer economically through war. However, this approach is limited when studying 
commercial institutions if most of the benefits are received by market actors. Instead we can 
approach states as autonomous actors that need vibrant markets in order to raise revenue through 
tax, thus reinforcing the interest that states have in promoting economic growth (through trade) and 
raising their opportunity costs of war (Bearce and Omori, 2005: 663). Another solution is proposed in 
this study and draws on work done by Polachek (1992) and Polachek and McDonald (1992), and 
highlighted by Barbieri (1996), in which [l]eaders are deterred from initiating conflict against 
important trading partners for fear of losing welfare gains associated with trade’ (ibid: 31). We can 
consider the domestic-stability effects of economic growth in the MENA region as being highly 
important to perhaps the most central policy goal of governing regimes in the region: regime 
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survival. As most states in the region express authoritarian as opposed to democratic tendencies, 
tenure in office is not lightly considered, and the notion of political change as a normal process is 
often not respected. We can, therefore, consider economic gains by market actors as highly relevant 
to the state actors engaging in regional commercial institutions. If society gains from increased trade, 
so too do states through increased stability, likewise if society experiences economic hardship, for 
example, from war, then states also suffer through increased instability.  
A further response to the problem of how states gain from increased economic integration 
and increased opportunity costs for war may be found in the relationship between state and market 
actors in the MENA. The distinction between state and ‘societal’ actors that Bearce and Omori 
highlight only applies in an ideal-type capitalist economy. The relationship between MENA 
governments and big business, for example, is highly complex and often ruling elites and economic 
elites are synonymous with each other.   
Aydin (2010: 523) notes the limitations of focusing solely on the direct deterrent effects of 
bilateral trade in any given bilateral relationship. This rather narrow research interest, it is argued, 
has been the dominant focus of much of the literature on economic interdependence and 
international conflict, which has tended to omit bilateral trades indirect effect on third-party states. 
By going beyond the dyad-level analysis, Aydin concludes that ‘extended deterrence success is most 
likely in cases where the defender and target are economically integrated through regional trade 
institutions as well as conducting heavy trade’ (ibid). The conclusion that regional trade institutions 
(in this study referred to as a specific form of commercial institution) are important to the 
promotion of peace and stability is particularly noteworthy. Indeed, Aydin shows that an assessment 
of the impact of trade on political behaviour and relations between multiple states requires an 
appreciation of the role of regional commercial institutions and a large number of overlapping 
dyadic analyses. Furthermore, an analysis of this kind can offer insights into the impact that trade 
has on states directly engaged in trade with each other as well as the deterrence effect of economic 
and institutional integration on third-party states (states that are not directly engaged in said 
integration) (ibid: 524).  
This position raises some important questions for the deterrence and peace promoting 
effects of GAFTA when considering that, as demonstrated by Elkhafif at el. (2012), Rouis (2012), 
Romagnoli, and Mengoni (2009), Abedini and Péridy (2008) among others, the evidence suggests 
that this agreement has had only a modest impact on increasing trade within the region overall, and 
much of this has been within sub-regions of the MENA (involving neighbouring states in the 
Maghreb or Gulf for example). Aydin (2010) argues that this framework to analyse the effects of 
trade on deterrence, assuming that ‘[i]f attackers are making use of the information about states’ 
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interest in the continuation of trade [with their trading partners], they would avoid initiating conflict 
against trade partners that can flock together to protect their economic stakes when one comes 
under attack’ (ibid: 524). It is important to note that Aydin’s theory of extended general deterrence 
regards institutionalized trade as more relevant in deterring third party attacks than simple total 
trade volumes. Institutionalized trade refers to trade between states who are members of regional 
institutional arrangements (including organizations such as the Arab League, and commercial 
institutions such as GAFTA) (ibid: 528). 
Bearce (2003) has noted that while much work has been done to advance the commercial 
institutional peace agenda, and ‘this research programme now provides stronger empirical evidence 
that commercial institutions produce positive security externalities in the developing world, it still 
fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter’ (ibid: 348) (italics in original). Using a similar 
approach to Oneal et al. (2003) Bearce (2003: 349-350) tests the argument that commercial 
institutions effect international relations in several ways: first, by ‘increasing the opportunity costs of 
war for the state’; second, providing state leaders with information ‘about other states’ military 
capabilities and […] intentions’; and third, building trust between state leaders by bringing them on a 
regular basis. One limitation with this final argument, however, is that the role of security apparatus 
and considerations is quite prominent in Bearce’s analysis. In particular, if the commercial institution 
being studied is embodied in an international organization (and not just an agreement) that deals 
with security in a traditional sense (considering war, sovereignty, military security and survival) then 
the argument that commercial institutions offer state leaders the opportunity to meet to discuss 
security issues stands up. But if the commercial institution exclusively relates to liberalizing trade 
between member states, and is just one agreement (among potentially many) formulated and 
maintained by an organizational forum that deals with economic and social issues (like the Economic 
and Social Council of the Arab League that oversees GAFTA) then the argument is harder to support.  
Bearce contributes to the commercial institutional peace research in several ways, but 
perhaps the most important (and relevant for this current study) is the way in which much literature 
offering theoretical explanations of the impact of trade agreements, for example, on peace can tell 
us something about the western world, but not as much about developing regions (ibid). The current 
study focuses on the MENA region and GAFTA specifically to seek answers to how this region has 
come to experience regional commercial institutions.   
Oneal et al. (2003) examine the what they term the causes of peace, by analysing the impact 
of democracy, economic interdependence (as measured by trade) and membership in international 
organizations. They examine the three legs of the Kantian tripod (republican constitutions, 
cosmopolitan law (free trade and economic interdependence), and international law) but see the 
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second as the most important (ibid: 372). In their work, Oneal et al. highlight the policy implications 
of the peace research agenda, and in particular the importance of understanding the relationship 
between each Kantian element when recommending ‘that policymakers promote democracy and 
trade internationally and participate in international organizations as a means of promoting world 
peace’ (ibid). By using the Correlates of War (CoW) project they study the onset of militarized 
disputes (‘in which either state threatened to use force, made a demonstration of its military 
capabilities, or actually used force against the other’ (ibid: 376)) as well as fatal disputes (‘in which at 
least one member of the armed forces of the parties to the conflict died’ (ibid)). They also use the 
Polity III data to assess the political character of governments (on a scale of democratic to 
authoritarian regimes), and the IMF’s Direction of Trade data to examine patterns of trade. To assess 
membership in intergovernmental organizations the Yearbook of International Organizations is used. 
Three other variables are also included in their analysis: capability ratio (balance of power), alliance 
(formal treaty of alliance), and contiguity and distance.  
In regards to trade Oneal et al. find that there is a pacific effect, with economic 
interdependence having a significant impact on reducing the risk of fatal disputes and wars (ibid: 
387-388). Interestingly, however, the nature of governing regimes also is found to have robust 
impact on promoting peace, with democracies that trade significantly with each other being least 
likely to engage in militarized conflict. This finding has serious  implications for an assessment of the 
impact of GAFTA as all member states are non-democracies. This raises questions about the impact 
of GAFTA on firstly, promoting trade, secondly reducing the chance of militarized conflict between 
member states, and finally, on promoting political cooperation overall.  
Goldsmith (2013) takes a rather different direction in trade and peace research by 
‘integrating expectations from schools of thought often portrayed as incompatible [to analyse] two 
aspects of trade – volume and interdependence – and model conflict as a two-stage process 
involving onset and escalation’ (ibid: 555). By considering trade as the key variable, and not 
exploring the effects of other variables Goldsmith offers an explanation of the impact of trade that 
does not account for the simultaneous effects of forms of governance, institutional membership, 
contiguity/proximity, and history, for example. But he does highlight that there is still much to be 
researched and he offers some insights into how we can deepen our understanding of the ways in 
which patterns of trade can effect international relations.  
Goldsmith ultimately concludes that trade can have both a positive and negative effect on 
international relations at different times. In some cases trade does inhibit conflict between states, 
but it can also facilitate it under certain conditions (ibid: 575). Specifically, he finds that: ‘trade 
interdependence inhibits the onset of militarized disputes, trade volume increases the risk of the 
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onset of militarized disputes, there is no relationship between trade interdependence and conflict 
escalation, and trade volume inhibits the escalation of militarized disputes to deadly interstate 
violence’ (ibid). The second conclusion is perhaps the most interesting, and unexpected if one 
adopts widely held assumptions about the liberal peace. This suggests an avenue for research 
concerning the effects of GAFTA and trade volume and interdependence at the regional level in the 
MENA. Goldsmith’s argument centres on the hypothesis ‘that trade interdependence, representing 
the opportunity costs of conflict, is likely to deter conflict onset, but that high volumes of trade, by 
increasing potential sources of tension, will make onset more likely [but] these roles revers once a 
conflict has begun and states consider escalation to war’ (ibid: 556) (italics in original). A useful  
contribution made here is to posit a distinction between trade interdependence and trade volume: 
the former relating to the proportion of dyadic trade to each state’s overall trade; and the latter 
relating to the amounts of specific traded goods or services (some of which may be more sensitive, 
valuable, or essential than others, and will thus, be considered differently in policy-making 
calculations).   
Importantly, Goldsmith (ibid: 558) considers total trade value as a proportion of gross 
domestic product (GDP) as well as total trade. The implication here is magnified when trade-related 
income represents a larger proportion of overall GDP. Given that many MENA economies are quite 
dependent exports (of hydrocarbons, for example) to raise revenues and foreign hard currency, 
and/or imports to meet domestic demands for goods (food, for example) and services that cannot 
be produced/provided domestically, viewing economic interdependence in a more nuanced manner 
may be necessary, and may provide more greater insights. However, one limitation in Goldsmith’s 
approach is that his logic of opportunity costs and signalling ‘rely on trade dependence being 
observable prior to the onset of a conflict’ (ibid) (italics in original) without taking into account the 
impact of perceptions about future opportunity costs as measured, for example, by estimations of 
potential future levels and nature of trade. One could posit that state leaders would maintain 
peaceful relations with their trade partners if doing so would promote expected future trade. An 
appreciation of the expectations of decision-makers responsible for creating and implementing 
commercial institutions would be necessary here though.  
In a similar manner, Benson and Niou (2007) argue that the economic interdependence 
literature fails to consider ‘states’ decisions to trade and initiate conflict as a function not only of 
their own utility but also of their perceptions about how their opponent will respond’ (ibid: 35). They 
develop a model that includes an analysis of states’ decisions to trade or engage in conflict by 
including social links, social contacts, and trust and respect as variables. Central to their study is the 
concern with the interplay between these variables and potential asymmetry in economic 
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interdependence, where one actor in the dyad is more economically reliant on the other. Benson 
and Niou note ‘that asymmetries in economically integrated dyads are likely to create incentives for 
the less dependent actor to exploit its bargaining leverage to manipulate the more dependent actor’ 
(ibid: 39).  
This approach certainly has some value and has helped to further our understanding of the 
trade-peace relationship, however, it risks placing too much emphasis on state actors without 
considering society/market actors and their role in initiating and maintaining trade. This poses 
problems because state are not the primary actors engaged in the production and exchange of 
goods and services. As Barbieri 1996: 31) notes, at least for liberal scholars, ‘trade patterns emerge 
naturally as a result of given heterogeneous factor endowments’. While Benson and Niou’s claim 
that the ‘[f]ailure to endogenize decision-makers’ choice to trade is a critical short-coming of existing 
trade studies’ (ibid: 40) is valid, this critique ignores the possibility that state leaders do not in fact 
have the power to decide whether or not to trade. Analysing market forces can prove far more 
fruitful in understanding why and how trade takes place as this approach allows us to examine the 
actual actors involved in production, exchange and consumption (which includes state actors only to 
some extent). Indeed, if the argument that states decide whether to trade or not is accurate then 
the establishment of commercial institutions like GAFTA and other FTAs would automatically result 
in increased trade. This is, however, not guaranteed and empirical studies have shown that the 
implementation of an FTA does not always have any impact on trade patterns. Studies that fail to 
differentiate between states and markets often prove ineffective (see: Strange, 1994).  
Benson and Niou’s model leads to conclusions that differ from similar studies. Instead of 
trade leading to peace, they conclude that there is ‘no unconditional relationship between trade and 
peace, but widespread opportunities for bluffing actually increase the unintended chances of 
conflict’ (Benson and Niou, 2007: 45). The contribution made by Benson and Niou is evident, yet is 
still incomplete. A consideration of market forces (and how they are perceived by state actors if one 
considers states as the primary focus) could reveal more about the nature of trade patterns and the 
impact on other aspects of international relations, and vice versa.  
According to Barbieri (1996: 30) we can identify four overarching theoretical approaches to 
understanding the impact of trade on international relations: first, that trade promotes peace (a 
liberal argument); second, symmetrical trade promotes peace while asymmetrical trade promotes 
conflict (a neo-Marxist approach); third, trade increases inter-state conflict (a neorealist argument); 
and finally, trade has no impact on interstate conflict. Barbieri’s work has furthered the commercial 
institutional peace agenda by re-examining the relationship between economic interdependence 
and peace/conflict by considering the impact of varying levels of interdependence on state 
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behaviour. She takes a historical approach and analyses the impact of economic interdependence on 
interstate relations during the 19th and 20th centuries, and finds that ‘[r]ather than inhibiting conflict, 
extensive economic interdependence increases the likelihood that dyads will engage in militarized 
interstate disputes’ (ibid: 29). Furthermore, ‘[e]xtreme interdependence, whether symmetrical or 
asymmetrical, has the greatest potential for increasing the likelihood of conflict’ (ibid). These 
conclusions run counter to the dominant hypothesis that trade promotes peace and Barbieri’s work 
encouraged further investigations to test her model. Key to this approach is consideration of both 
the benefits and costs of trade. The latter has generally been ignored by liberal scholars who focus 
on the positive effects of trade as a means to understand increased opportunity costs and increased 
rewards from trade. Barbieri (ibid: 31) notes that if costs are greater than benefits then trade may 
lead to conflict rather than peace, especially in an asymmetric trading relationship.  
It is important to note here that drawing on Keohane and Nye (1977), interdependence and 
interconnectedness are seen as distinct from each other, with the former representing extensive 
mutual vulnerability and sensitivity, and the latter representing weak linkages between states. 
Barbieri tests four hypotheses: ‘[d]yads composed of states with salient economic relationships are 
less likely than other dyads to engage in militarized conflicts; [d]yads composed of states with 
symmetrical dependence are less likely than others to engage in militarized conflicts; [t]he presence 
of both extensive and mutual dependence – interdependence – reduces the likelihood that dyads will 
engage in militarized conflicts; [t]he interactive and additive effects of the two dimensions of 
interdependence – salience and symmetry – reduce the likelihood that dyads engage in inter-state 
conflict’ (Barbieri, 1996: 34-35) (italics in original). These hypotheses are tested by analysing several 
variables for 14,341 dyad years from 1870-1938. The dependent variables are: militarized interstate 
disputes and interdependence; while the control variables are: contiguity and geographic proximity, 
joint democracy, relative capabilities, and alliance ties. 
One limitation here, however, is that Barbieri focuses ‘exclusively on conflictual events, 
assuming that the absence of intense conflict, rather than the presence of cooperation, is more 
consistent with the notion of peace’ (ibid: 35). The argument that the absence of conflict is more 
consistent with peace is valid yet international relations are rarely characterised by conflict or 
cooperation alone. Instead states should be seen as having multiple interactions in different areas of 
their relations with other states. Furthermore, it is limiting to see states as unitary actors where the 
same governmental offices and people are involved in all forms of international relationships. In 
other words we need to account for the ways in which different state institutions interact with their 
counterparts in other states (in addition to other parts of their own state apparatus). Taking into 
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account cooperative events in addition to conflictual events (which, after all, do not exclusively 
relate to militarized disputes) could offer more insights into trade’s effect on cooperation.  
Barbieri concludes that, according to the results of the full interdependence model 
employed in her study, ‘the extension of trade linkages will inevitably lead to an increased 
probability that dyads engage in militarized disputes’ (ibid: 40). Furthermore, ‘when 
interdependence is at its maximum, dyads are 25 times as likely to engage in a MID than when 
interdependence is at its minimum’ (ibid). These findings are contrary to much of the scholarship 
that supports the liberal peace thesis. A reason for this disparity may be the differences in time 
periods analysed (with Barbieri focusing on the pre-World War Two period, and other studies 
considering longer periods with data up to the early 2000s). Another might be the exclusion of some 
variables such as the impact of the perceptions of state leaders; the impact of trust, norms and 
formal mechanisms for state leaders to communicate; cultural similarity; and historical relations.  
 Oneal and Russett (1999) have tested the ‘pacific benefits’ of economic integration (through 
trade) and democracy and IGO membership. They posit a set of assumptions that rely on Kantian 
logic and elements shared with realist thought relating to anarchy and power. They assume that the 
international system is characterised by anarchy and that ‘power is important’ (ibid: 4). They also see 
states as being constrained by ‘power, alliances, and distance’ and as being ‘concerned with ‘the 
balance of power and the coincidence of national interests expressed in alliances’ (ibid). Distance 
from one another is also considered as an important variable that shapes the nature of inter-state 
behaviour with Oneal and Russett arguing that ‘in general, the farther apart two states are, the 
fewer the issues over which to fight and the less threat they pose to one another’ (ibid). Their 
theoretical model uses these assumptions as a foundation against which they assess the impact of 
economic integration, democracy and international law. By adding variables that relate to the 
Kantian tripod Oneal and Russett test three hypotheses: first, that democracies are less prone to 
using force; second, that ‘economically important trade’ promotes peaceful relations; and third, that 
international organizations promote peace (ibid: 4-5). Of particular importance to the present study 
is the second hypothesis.  
As Oneal and Russett highlight ‘[e]vidence for the pacific benefits of economic 
interdependence […] is less widely accepted than is that for the democratic peace’ (ibid: 5) and their 
work has sought to investigate this are further. Furthermore, they argue that the effects of trade on 
international relations have been subject to more counter-arguments that the other two Kantian 
hypotheses. This is evidenced by the work of Barbieri (1996), Benson and Niou (2007), and 
Goldsmith (2013) who conclude that increased trade either can or even does lead to conflict being 
more likely. One of the limitations to the methodology used by Oneal and Russett (1999: 9), 
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however, is that only ‘bilateral trade as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP)’ is used as a 
measure of economic integration and economically important trade/economic interdependence. As 
has been demonstrated elsewhere, and as argued for in this study, measuring and examining the 
nature of trade and its impact on economic integration (and how this is perceived by state and 
market actors) needs to be more sophisticated. In particular, considering trade as a proportion of 
total trade (and not just GDP) per dyadic member, trade volume by specific goods and services, and 
trade compatibility, offers greater insights.  
After examining 6,000 dyads and approximately 150,000 observations from 1885-1992 
Oneal and Russett find that ‘democracy, economic interdependence, and involvement in 
international organizations reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state disputes’ (ibid: 34). In 
terms of trade, this effect is very significant with important trade integration leading to a reduction 
in the likelihood of a MID by over half. At the systemic level Oneal and Russett conclude that ‘the 
international system is more peaceful when there are more democracies and when trade is greater’ 
(ibid). Like most of the other literature on the Kantian peace or broader commercial institutional 
peace research, Oneal and Russett’s findings represent a universally applicable set of conclusions as 
the data they analyse covers all states. This provides us with an opportunity to test whether there 
are variations in these findings if smaller groups of states are considered, that is, at the regional level. 
Does trade and economic integration in the MENA, for example, lead to a reduction in the likelihood 
and occurrence of MIDs in that region as Oneal and Russett’s findings would suggest? If there was 
variation then this would tell us that something about the MENA region is somewhat unique, or at 
least different, from other regions/the world as a whole.  
Kim and Rousseau (2005) have re-examined Oneal and Russett’s (1999) model and findings 
and by considering the reciprocal causation/the simultaneity problem between economic 
interdependence and military violence, this being the effect that trade has on MIDs and vice versa. 
They use a two-stage probit least squares approach to control for this reciprocity and re-analyse 
Oneal and Russett’s dataset and find that economic interdependence does not reduce the possibility 
of conflict between trade partners while ‘international conflict reduces economic interdependence’ 
(Kim and Rousseau, 2005: 523). Kim and Rousseau explore the effect that the simultaneity problem 
has on twelve hypotheses that they have identified as most common explanations of military conflict 
found in the liberal peace literature. The most relevant hypothesis tested for this current study is: 
‘[i]n an international dispute, the more economically interdependent a state is with its adversary, 
the less likely it is to use military force to resolve the dispute’ (ibid: 524). Of particular note here, is 
that the model used by Kim and Rousseau finds that ‘states that share preferential trading 
agreement(s) […] are more likely to be interdependent with each other; but, economic 
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interdependence is higher between states across regions rather than within regions’ (ibid: 540). 
Nevertheless, their key finding is that economic interdependence does not . 
A strength in Kim and Rousseau’s work is that they consider a large number of variables 
often not considered by others at the same time, including: levels of democracy;  balance of forces; 
shared alliance ties; satisfaction with the status quo; contiguity, distance and major power; different 
civilization group; conflict interaction level; GDPs and populations; and shared preferential trade 
agreement membership (ibid: 531-532). A limitation to the application of this model, however, is 
that while the simultaneity problem is considered, the overall conclusion that war reduces economic 
interdependence is not new (and is highly expected), and the assessment that this finding reinforces 
the argument that economic interdependence does not reduce the likelihood of MIDs is somewhat 
unoriginal (Copeland (1996) and Reuveny (2001) amongst others have already demonstrated this 
quite conclusively). A deeper analysis of the ways in which the nature of trade impacts broader 
international relations is necessary.  
Copeland (1996) offers one of the earliest post-cold war investigations into the relationship 
between trade and war by asking ‘[d]oes economic interdependence increase or decrease the 
probability of among states?’ (ibid: 5). Copeland highlights that while much IR scholarship has dealt 
with the causes of war, with liberals and realists in particular offering diametrically opposed 
conclusions about which variables are relevant, ‘[e]conomic interdependence is the only factor that 
plays an important causal role in the thinking of both [liberal and realist] camps’ (ibid). For Copeland 
there was a need to further examine the relationship between trade and conflict in international 
relations because the dominant liberal and realist approaches proved insufficient in explaining the 
relationship and predicting future international relations. In particular, while liberals argue that 
‘interdependent states would rather trade than invade’ and realists argue that ‘[i]n anarchy, states 
must constantly worrying about their security [and] mutual dependence and thus vulnerability […] 
gives states an incentive to initiate war’ (ibid: 5-6) neither school can adequately explain the causes 
of major wars such as the two world wars. It is important to note that this is still largely the case with 
competing arguments and findings. Copeland uses the theory of trade expectations to overcome the 
failures of both liberal and realist approaches. This theory assumes that ‘[t]he total of the benefits 
and potential costs of versus autarchy reveals the true level of dependence a state faces, for if trade 
is completely severed, the state not only loses the gains from trade but also suffers the costs of 
adjusting its economy to the new situation’ (ibid: 6). Of particular importance here is the inclusion of 
an under-used variable: expectations of future trade. Considering this variable allows us to bring in 
the decision-makers as significant actors in determining state behaviour and lets us move beyond 
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simply viewing states as rather unitary actors responding in the same way to the same conditions 
across space and time.  
Copeland examines both levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade at the 
same time and argues that high levels of interdependence ‘can be either peace-inducing or war-
inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade’ (ibid: 7). In other words, where states are 
highly economically integrated with others but feel their ability to trade will be hindered/limited in 
the future the realist assumption that trade can lead to war may prove to be correct, while if said 
state’s expectation is that trade in the future will be high then the liberal assumption of trade 
promoting peace will be correct. Assuming that trade can lead to either conflict of peace is quite 
unique in the commercial institutional peace research and broader liberal peace research and is one 
of the strengths of Copeland’s work. He ultimately concludes that the liberal view that international 
institutions along with trade can promote peace by the former ensuring positive future expectations 
of the latter, but also that ‘poor bilateral diplomacy’ (ibid: 41) can remove the pacifying effect of 
trade by leading to negative future expectations. We can, however, find weaknesses in Copeland’s 
methodology as he only applies his theoretical model to a small number of historical cases. It is 
necessary to apply this approach and consider the variable of future trade expectations to a larger 
sample of cases and include other variables to fully appreciate the impact expectations can have.  
 Reuveny (2001) has contributed to our understanding of how trade does not necessarily 
lead only to conflict/only to peace by developing a mathematical model of dyadic trade and political 
conflict/cooperation. This model ‘predicts that the effect of bilateral trade quantity on 
conflict/cooperation and the effect of conflict/cooperation on the monetary value of trade may be 
positive or negative, whereas the effect of conflict on trade quantity will be negative’ (ibid: 132). 
Reuveny’s starting point is an appreciation of the observations made by various unidirectional 
statistical studies that have found that trade effects conflict/cooperation, and others that have 
found that conflict/cooperation effects trade. Reuveny builds on Copeland’s (1996) work by 
examining the possibility that trade and conflict/cooperation impact on each other in different ways 
given different contexts. Reuveny does this by replacing the unitary state actor with three types of 
actor (government, importer and exporter in each dyad state) (ibid).  
One of the most intriguing findings made by Reuveny is that there are differences in the 
relationship between trade and conflict/cooperation when considering relations between Eastern 
and Western states on the one hand, and between states within the West on the other.  Specifically, 
Reuveny finds that ‘the East-West trade and conflict nexus is generally more significant than the 
West-West nexus and is potentially more sensitive to conflict’ (ibid: 132). The implications of this 
finding are that trade does not have one universally applicable effect on other areas of international 
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relations (and vice versa) and that different regions can experience the impact of trade in various 
ways. This raises questions about the impact of trade within specific regions (and not just between 
states across regions) outside of the West. In the context of this current study: the MENA region. The 
overarching finding made by Reuveny is that ‘trade and conflict theories may miss important 
elements, pointing out the need for richer, more microfounded theoretical models’ (ibid).  
Reuveny’s approach is also useful in demonstrating the possibility of opening up commercial 
institutional peace and broader liberal peace research to include more factors. In his work, Reuveny 
considered three aspects of trade and conflict that had previously largely been ignored: ‘trade and 
conflict simultaneity, action-reaction conflict/cooperation dynamics, and the identity of trade and 
conflict actors’ (ibid: 133). A limitation (as rightly highlighted by Reuveny in his work) is that trade is 
not disaggregated in Reuveny’s model and so there is no means to differentiate between the effects 
of sensitive and non-sensitive trade. The make-up of trade and the impact of trade sensitivity are 
considered in the current study. 
Gartzke et al. (2001) offer an interesting approach to focusing our analyses to develop our 
understanding of how economic interdependence effects international conflict and other areas of 
international relations. A key initial observation made is that ‘cross-border economic relationships 
are far broader than just trade’ (ibid: 391). This is reinforced by the fact that ‘[g]lobal capital markets 
dwarf the exchange of goods and services, and states engage in varying degrees of monetary policy 
coordination’ (ibid). By analysing capital flows and monetary policy as well as trade in goods and 
services, Gartzke et al. deepen our understanding of the ways in which disruption to economic 
linkages can deter conflicts. Their findings suggest that ‘capital interdependence contributes to 
peace independent of the effects of trade, democracy, interest, and other variables’ (ibid). 
Overall, Gartzke et al. argue that ‘[e]conomic interdependence can motivate peace in two 
ways (ibid: 400) (emphasis in original): first, by raising the costs of conflict relative to the expected 
benefits, and second, by ‘conveying credible signals, obviating the need for costly military contests’ 
(ibid: 401). Furthermore, capital flows are central to this pacific effect, because ‘[c]apital 
interdependence [allows] states to engage in costly signalling and reducing the need to resort to 
violence to obtain settlements’ (ibid: 402). It is important to note that Gartzke et al. do not contend 
that all conflict is avoidable, rather they argue that economic interactions can help to resolve 
disputes without restoring to violence. Their argument is tested by developing the methodology 
used by Oneal and Russett (1999). Their dependent variable is the onset of a MID (as common, 
coded as 1 for a dyad year in which the force is threatened, displayed, or used, and zero if not) with 
a key difference being the consideration of MID onset as opposed to involvement as used by Oneal 
and Russett. Two independent variables are used to measure monetary interdependence (‘pegging’, 
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coded as 1 for the existence of pegging one currency to another, and zero otherwise; and ‘joint 
currency area’, coded 1 if the states in a dyad both peg their currency to the same third currency, 
and zero otherwise). A further two variables are used to measure capital investment (capital 
openness, and capital flows). Several control variables are used: interdependence, regime type 
(democracy or autocracy, rates of change in GDP per capita (to measure economic growth), 
geographic contiguity, allies, and capability ratios. ‘Affinity’ is used to control for preference 
similarity. 
One limitation with this methodology, however, is that while measuring capital investments 
adds another dimension to our understanding of economic interdependence, the problem of how 
state actors relate to capital flows remains. So while Gartzke et al. convincingly highlight that ‘capital 
seeks higher risk-adjusted returns [and] risk is contingent on government restrictions’ (ibid: 407) it is 
unclear how governments benefit from capital flows, and therefore, how capital investment factors 
into governmental decision-making. A mechanism to resolve this problem by examining the 
relationship between decision-makers the state and market, as well as the capital-related policy 
interests of the former, is necessary. It is misleading to assume that all states always perceive capital 
as a vital interest.  We may, for example, find it useful to understand the relationship between big 
business (the real beneficiaries of capital investment) and government.  
McDonald (2004) builds on earlier research on the liberal peace ‘by exploring another 
resource of domestic variation – the extent to which governments regulate international trade’ and 
argues that ‘a shift from aggregate trade flows to the level of free trade as the crucial independent 
variable, provides the opportunity to push the debate forward’ (ibid: 548). Central to McDonald’s 
approach is the observation that increasing trade tends to both increase overall national economic 
prosperity but at the same time also alters the domestic distribution of income. Some domestic 
groups (actors in import-competing sectors, for example), therefore, are likely to resist greater 
economic integration and will not ‘lobby the state for a pacific foreign policy that promotes 
expanding transnational economic ties’ (ibid). Free trade removes the foundations of domestic 
privilege for those groups who are likely to resist economic integration in the form of imports, and 
thus reduces the capabilities of these groups to ‘reduce the capacity of free-trading interests to limit 
aggression in foreign policy’ (ibid: 549). McDonald bring the domestic level of analysis into the 
analysis of the pacific effects of trade.  
To measure the level of trade protection within a state, McDonald uses two key indicators: 
‘the ratio of a country’s customs duties to its total imports’ (ibid: 557) and ‘political barriers to trade’ 
(ibid: 558). To test the hypothesis that higher levels of protection will lead to higher probability of 
conflict, he uses the standard dyad-year as the unit of analysis and several variables are examined. 
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The dependent variable is the onset of a MID (with the value set at 1 for onset in the first year, and 
zero otherwise). In order to ensure robustness, the following control variables are used in 
McDonald’s model: democracy (scores for each state are allocated on the scale of -10 to 10 using the 
Polity 4 dataset); GDP for the largest economy in the dyad (this variable is included to control for any 
possible effect increased trade may have on military capabilities through increasing economic 
resources); economic growth (measured by the percentage change in GDP per capita over three 
years); alliances; interests; capabilities ratios; major power; contiguity; and distance. McDonald 
ultimately concludes that ‘[f]ree trade reduces military conflict in the international system by 
undermining the domestic political power of interests that benefit from conflict and by limiting the 
state’s ability to enact commercial policies to build domestic coalitional support for its war machine’ 
(ibid: 568-569).   
McDonald’s approach is quite valuable and the focus on domestic processes and 
relationships is somewhat more compelling (and effective in terms of the overall analysis) than 
analyses that consider states as unitary actors with no significant variations between them. However, 
there is a limitation to this approach and room for further investigation. Namely, the mechanisms by 
which the relationship between governmental actors and domestic pro/anti-trade groups within the 
state are played out (and indeed, the ways in which governments can market actors can overlap) has 
not been fully developed.   
Polachek et al. (1994) build on some of the earlier peace research literature that analysed 
trade’s impact by introducing new variables into older models. They argue that foreign aid, tariffs, 
contiguity and relative country-size also need to be analysed as independent variables (ibid: 405). By 
integrating these additional factors into their methodology Polachek et al. are able to demonstrate 
how trade affects conflict/peace in a more robust manner than earlier studies that only considered 
total levels of bilateral trade and levels of interdependence by dyad. They find that foreign aid and 
contiguity increase the gains from trade, while tariffs have the opposite effect. Furthermore, their 
findings concretely demonstrate that the benefits from trade (and therefore, the promotion of 
peace and cooperation) are greater for small states when they trade with large states, than for small 
state-small state trade. Likewise, for large states greater benefits are experiences when trading with 
other large states than with small states (ibid: 418). A key element of their methodology is to 
acknowledge that while most studies use a dyadic approach (as Polachek et al. do) it is necessary ti 
extend the model of analysis because any ‘two countries do not trade in a vacuum independent of 
other countries’ (ibid: 409). Thus they include third party conflict in their analysis in a similar way to 
Aydin (2010).  
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In many ways a front-runner to more recent analyses, Polachek et al. hypothesise that along 
with the five independent variables highlighted above, third party considerations also have an 
impact on how trade affects conflict. They hypothesise that ‘[a]n actor with improved terms of trade 
[…] with a target [country] will decrease conflict with a third party […] if the third parry and target 
are friends’ (ibid: 411). Furthermore, ‘[a]n actor with improved terms of trade with a target will 
increase conflict with a third party, if the third party and target are rivals’ (ibid). Ultimately, they find 
that these hypotheses are correct. Yet, while Polachek et al.’s approach has developed our 
understanding of the impacts of trade on conflict/peace, there are limitations in terms of the 
independent variables measured. Their model leaves no room for an assessment of the impact of a 
range of variables that (as discussed above and below) according to other works, are demonstrably 
important: including, institutional membership, cultural affinity, the history of the dyadic 
relationship, and military capabilities. A limitation with many of the models employed in the liberal 
peace literature, especially investigations of trade and commercial institutions, often are limited by 
the relatively small number of variables considered, with few studies including all of the relevant 
variables at once.   
 
Methodology  
 
This study examines the relationship between commercial institutions, trade and peace between 21 
states in the MENA region and a total of 420 dyads. The unit of analysis is dyad-year over the period 
1950-2014, totalling 26,880 dyad-years.  
This study is carried out in two stages, each relating to one of the key hypotheses being 
tested here. Each phase has one independent variable, one dependent variable, and a number of 
control variables (see below). The first stage explores the relationship between commercial 
institutions (stage one independent variable) in the MENA and trade volume (stage one dependent 
variable). The second stage explores the relationship between trade (stage two independent variable) 
and peace (stage two dependent variable) in the MENA. Again, a number of control variables are 
included.   
 
Stage one  
The independent variable – Commercial Institutional Membership 
This project classifies commercial institutions into five categories depending on degree of intensity. 
A dataset has been created for commercial institutional membership. The data was collated from 
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World Trade Organisation country reports and corroborated by respective national ministries. This 
dataset contains scores for each dyad on a scale of 0-5 using the following approach:   
 
Score Coded by Highest Level Engagement 
5 Economic Union 
4 Common Market 
3 Comprehensive FTA (bilateral or multilateral) – goods and services 
with limited exemptions 
2 Limited FTA (bilateral or multilateral) – goods only, limited 
exemptions 
1 Weak FTA (bilateral or multilateral) – goods only, significant 
exemptions 
0 No CI membership 
 
The Dependent Variable –  Trade Volume 
The creation of a dataset on bilateral trade between states in the MENA region was accomplished 
using the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics database.  Data was collated in 
current US$ for each dyad-year for the period 1950-2014 (or from the year of independence, for 
example, 1956 for Morocco).  
 
The control variables 
 
1. Trade compatibility/ trade congruence 
Saez (2008) employs a useful concept of trade congruence/incongruence as being central to 
understanding the structural promotion/inhibition of bilateral trade. Here the structure of each 
states’ export base (their leading export goods and services) and import base (their leading goods 
and services imports) are important. Where one dyadic state’s export base is equivalent to its 
partner’s import base, this state can be classed as ‘unilaterally congruent’ (ibid: 708). If both states’ 
exports bases are equivalent to each other’s import bases the dyad is classed as bilaterally 
congruent (ibid). If neither sate’s export base is equivalent to the other’s import base then the dyad 
is incongruent (ibid). Saez uses a scale of equivalency positing that economies are not fixed and can 
change over time, becoming more or less congruent with others. This study uses the concept of 
trade congruence/incongruence to understand the potential for trade.  
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Shui and Walkenhorst (2010: 267-295) use a bilateral product complementarity index to 
examine how similar the export basket of one state and the import basket of the other in a dyad are. 
The value of their index ranges from 0 when there is no complementarity, and 100 when there is 
perfect complementarity. Here ‘the higher the index between two countries, the greater the product 
complementarity’ (ibid: 277) and thus more bilateral trade is likely due to market factors and 
government policies aimed at promoting trade (such as the creation of commercial institutions like 
GAFTA). 
 
2. Contiguity and proximity/distance 
As highlighted above, even in a globalising world, distance places demands and constraints on the 
transportation of goods, resources and people. Trading over greater distances may be limited in 
some respects due to the time and cost involved (for example, trade in fresh agricultural produce 
can be constrained by the time required to travel greater distances. Increased transport costs can 
reduce profits, thus lowering the exporter’s incentives to trade). Dyads are coded as 3 if the dyad 
states share a land or littoral border; 2 if they are separated by one state; 1 if they are separated by 
two states; and 0 if they are separated by three or more states. While Oneal and Russett consider 
proximity relevant in the context of the ability of one state to deploy military capabilities to attack 
another, this study considers proximity relevant to facilitating trade (through increasing the 
potential for trade in perishable goods, and lower transportation time and overall costs) as well as to 
military activity. Therefore, if greater distance ‘reduces the capability to fight’ (ibid) it can also 
reduce the potential for trade. 
 
3. Cultural Affinity 
Actor behaviour can be influenced by awareness of perceived and actual cultural affinity. This study 
defines cultural affinity as the extent of shared language and religious characteristics, and posits that 
where cultural similarities are intense (for example, where two communities share the exact same 
language and religion) there will likely be an impact on bilateral trade. Culture can influence the 
types of goods and services that are required, for example, food and clothing products that meet 
specific religious standards; or services provided in a common language, such as Arabic. 0 is assigned 
where 0-9% of the population of each community share the same cultural element;  1 is assigned 
where 10-39% of the population of each community share the same cultural element; 2 is assigned 
where 40-79% of the population of each community share the same cultural element; and 3 is 
assigned where 80+% of the population of each community share the same cultural element. 
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4. Population size 
The size of a population is synonymous with the size of market (when combined with GDP and GDP 
per capita as discussed below). Market size determines the potential for trade, with an advanced,  
large market of affluent citizens having the ability to purchase goods and services (leading to a high 
demand for imports), and large productive capacity (the ability to produce/provide goods and 
services for export). Less advanced, small markets with poor citizens, on the other hand, will have 
limited import needs due to low purchasing power and low demand, and less productive capacity 
and thus low export potential. The World Bank’s Databank has been used to create a dataset on 
population sizes for each state and dyad.  
 
5. GDP Size 
The size of a state/market’s economy, as measured by GDP (purchasing power parity (PPP) method) 
acts in much the same way as population size, in shaping demand for imports, and capacity for 
exports. The World Bank’s Databank has been used to create a dataset on GDP PPP for each state 
and dyad.  
 
6. GDP per capita 
The total size of a state/market’s economy is determined, not only by overall GDP and population, 
but also by the affluence of the population and, therefore, the purchasing power of individual 
consumers. A relatively large GDP but small affluent population may limit imports and exports. 
Likewise, a large, yet poor population will also limit imports and exports. Assessing the purchasing 
power of individual consumers is, therefore, necessary. The World Bank’s Databank has been used 
to create a dataset on GDP per capita (PPP) for each state and dyad.  
 
Stage two 
The Independent variable – Trade Volume (1950-2014) 
The same dataset on trade volume for each MENA dyad-year used in stage one is used here.  
 
The Dependent Variable – Peace 
Pease is a difficult concept to quantify, measure and analyse. Building on work done by other 
scholars, this study considers peace to be the absence of militarised interstate disputes (MIDs). As 
such, where an MID exists we can conclude peace is absent. The Correlates of War classifications of 
MIDs is used here, where an MID can be any of the following: the threat of force, display of force, or 
actual use of force against another state. Aydin (2010) uses data on militarized actions from the 
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Correlates of War (CoW) data set on Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) 2.1 Dataset. These 
datasets are used by Aydin to collect evidence on the initiators of conflict and on the capabilities of 
potential attackers and defenders. Goldsmith (2013) also uses these sources.  
 Oneal and Russett (1999) use the CoW data on MIDs to examine involvement in MIDs as one 
of their dependent variable. Where a MID has taken place 1 is used, while 0 is used if no MID 
occurred. They ‘code each year that a dyad was involved in a dispute in which one or both states 
threatened to use force, made a demonstration of force, or actually used military force against the 
other’ (ibid: 10). They lag their independent variables by one year (as most studies do to ensure that 
the variables are not affected by the dispute being analysed (if one occurs)). Of particular 
importance to this current study is their approach to economic interdependence. They use IMF 
statistics on bilateral trade from the IMF’s Direction of Trade statistics dataset and posit that the 
‘likelihood of a dispute [is] primarily a function of the freedom of the less constrained state to use 
force’ (ibid: 13), where having a lower trade-to-GDP ratio in any given dyad represents being less 
dependent on said trade and, therefore, less constrained on behaviour to the dyadic partner. Oneal 
and Russett also consider capabilities, alliances, and contiguity and distance as important variables in 
their overall analysis of the three Kantian hypotheses. 
 
The control variables 
 
1. Contiguity and proximity/distance 
As highlighted above, under normal conditions (i.e. where one or both dyad states are not global 
hegemons or great powers) the farther two states are from each other the less they have to fight 
about. Therefore, contiguity may increase the chances for conflict, while dyadic peace increases 
along with distance. The same dataset used in stage one is used here.  
 
2. Regime Type (form of governance) 
Data on political regime types was collated using the Centre for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV project, 
where each state being studied here is awarded a score of +10 (absolute democracy) to -10 
(absolute autocracy). This methodology allows us to control for the more pacific behaviour of 
democratic states and the more aggressive behaviour of autocratic states. The assumption held here 
being that a dyad constituted by two democratic states (with higher Polity IV scores) will be more 
peaceful than dyads constituted by either one democratic and one autocratic state, or two 
autocratic states.  
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3. Military capabilities (composite indicator of national capabilities (CINC)) 
It is important to control for the balance of power/balance of threat. Where one dyadic state is 
militarily superior the weaker state is more likely to be deterred by the imbalance of power that 
favours its partner. The opposite may be true for the more dominant state which will not be 
deterred in the same way. A dataset of national military capabilities has been created using the 
Correlates of War’s National Material Capabilities (v.4.0) – the composite index of national 
capabilities (CINC) scores have been used. This data considers: iron and steel production; military 
expenditures; military personnel; primary energy consumption; total population; and urban 
population.   
 
4. Alliance 
As highlighted above, state behaviour can be constrained/influenced by alliances and so it is 
important to assess the nature of any formal alliance agreements between the states being studied 
here. The Correlates of War’s Formal Alliance v4.1 dataset is used here to collect data on four types 
of alliance: defence, neutrality, nonaggression, and entente pacts, covering the period of study 
(1950-2014). This data set has been used to score all individual dyads 0-4 according to the number of 
formal alliance elements (0 where no formal alliance exists, 1 where only one element (e.g. a 
defence pact) exists, 2 where two elements exist, 3 where three elements exist, and 4 where all four 
formal alliance elements exist).  
 
5. Institutional Membership 
State behaviour can be constrained/influenced by international laws and in particular membership in 
inter-governmental organisations. Therefore, joint IGO membership is measured for each dyad 
throughout the period of study and scores generated. The Yearbook of International Organizations 
and the Correlates of War have been used to create a single dataset on IGO membership for states 
studied here. The Correlates of War numerical value system has been used to generate dyadic scores. 
This system is as follows: No Membership = 0; Full Membership = 1; Associate Membership = 2; 
Observer = 3.  
 
6. Cultural affinity 
Actor behaviour can be influenced by awareness of perceived and actual cultural affinity. This study 
defines cultural affinity as the extent of shared language and religious characteristics, and posits that 
where cultural similarities are intense (for example, where two communities share the exact same 
language and religion) they will be more peaceful in their relationship with one another. Likewise, 
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where there is no cultural affinity, there will be less inhibitors to conflict. The same dataset for 
cultural affinity used in stage one is used here. A dataset has been created for this study that scores 
each dyad on a scale from 0-6 by totalling scores for two elements (language and religion).  
 
7. Trade Interdependence 
Accounting for trade volume only tells us part of the story when considering the deterrent effects of 
trade. We need to also control for the significance of any given trade relationship to each dyad state. 
Trade interdependence relates to the proportion of dyadic trade to each state’s overall trade – 
where a higher percentage of overall trade equates to a more relevant trade relationship, and the 
lower the percentage of overall trade equates to lower importance for the trade relationship.  
 
Findings (incomplete section) 
 
Stage One  
Variable No. of Observed Dyad Correlations 
( /10,080 ) 
% Dyad Correlations 
C.I. (Ind.) 360 3.6 
Trade Congruence 4704 46.7 
Contiguity/Distance 2400 23.8 
Cultural Affinity 600 5.7 
Population Size 480 4.8 
GDP 1632 16.1 
GDP Per Capita 2784 27.6 
 
Hypothesis 1 = Disproven  
 
Stage Two (incomplete) 
Variable No. of Observed Dyad Correlations 
( /420 ) 
% Dyad Correlations (1990-
2014) 
Trade Volume (Ind.)   
Contiguity/Distance   
Regime Type   
Military capabilities   
Alliance 
Institutional 
Membership 
  
Cultural affinity   
Trade 
Interdependence 
  
 
Hypothesis 2 =  
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